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I. JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction is secured by U.C.A. § 78-2a-2(3)(j), and is not
disputed by any party.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW,
AUTHORITY AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN RECORD
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(h), Appellee Mark A. Steen ("Mark") accepts
the "Statement of Issues, Standard of Appellate Review, Authority and Preservation
of Issues in Record" provided by Co-Appellee Mi Vida Enterprises, Inc. ("Mi
Vida"), which provides a far more thorough and accurate account of the proper
standard of review applicable to the various issues presented by Appellant for review.
In particular, Mark would underscore a point made by Co-Appellee Mi Vida in its
Answer Brief, namely, the Appellants' failure to comply with Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). Appellants have failed to present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the findings the
Appellants now appeal.
But worse than that, the Appellants have omitted some of the most important
facts - some of which are so significant that they effectively determine the issues
raised here on appeal. Salient, too, is the fact that Appellants have neglected, if that
be the word, to append the trial court's more detailed "Ruling on Motion to Certify as
Final" of December 3, 2002, as distinct from the "Order Certifying Summary
Judgment" of the same date. While the latter is appended as Exhibit 12 of the
Addendum to Brief of Appellants, the former, mysteriously, is not. This omission is
1

significant because the former contains much of the detail that Appellants claim is
required if a proper certification is to be granted. This complaint about a lack of
detail is the focus of Appellants' second issue on appeal. It can be readily resolved
by simply reviewing the Ruling, as distinct from the Order, which is appended in
Mark A. Steen's own Addendum filed with this Answer Brief.
Also appended in Mark A. Steen's Addendum is the trial court's initial
"Ruling on Motions for Preliminary Injunction" since that ruling, issued at the very
outset of this case on April 12, 2000, set the tone for all that followed.
III. STATUTES
The pertinent statutes applicable in this case are as follows:
U.C.A. § 16-10a-740
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1430
U.C.A. §16-10a-1431
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1432
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434
U.C.A. § 78-12-27
U.C.A. § 78-12-56
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Response to "Procedural" History
Mark adopts Co-Appellee Mi Vida's Response to Appellants' "Procedural"
History. However, Mark would add that certain factual evidence presented in the
trial phase of this case, which occurred in April and May of 2003, confirmed certain
holdings made earlier in the case, back in September of 2002, in what we will call the
summary judgment phase.
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Recall that the substance of this case originated in the district court for
Boulder County, Colorado when the Appellants and certain other putative
shareholders ("the Dissidents"), holding one-sixth of the stock of Mi Vida, filed a
complaint seeking the judicial dissolution of Mi Vida and the interim appointment of
a receiver ("the Colorado Action"). The complaint further alleged a host of direct
and derivative shareholder claims of the standard sort required in order to justify
dissolution. These claims were alleged against not only Mi Vida but Mark, both
individually and in his capacity as personal representative of his mother's estate,
Mark's brother John Steen ("John") and his father, Charles A. Steen, Sr., as well as a
number of Colorado companies in which Mark held an equity interest.
Since the bulk of the shareholder claims, which provided "grounds" for
dissolution, concerned transactions that occurred seven to more than twenty years
prior to the filing of the suit, these claims were vulnerable to a dismissal based on a
statute of limitations defense. When Mi Vida moved to dismiss them on this basis
here in Utah, Appellant Nancy Ciddio Steen-Adams ("Nancy") defended by arguing
that she did not actually know about the transactions, that Mark and others were
obliged to tell her about them, and they did not do so or did so inadequately.
Mi Vida replied that if Nancy did not actually know, she should have known,
about the transactions underlying her claims, and that where she was not actually
informed about these events, she was put on the "inquiry notice" years and years ago,
so that the three year statute of limitations to file any claim of these ancient causes of
action had long since expired.
3

The details of how the trial court resolved these issues back in 2002 can be
found in the court's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order," dated
September 16, 2002, which Appellants have appended as Exhibit 3 to their
Addendum. These details are discussed extensively below. Again, this ruling on
summary judgment was subsequently certified as final for purposes of appeal by the
trial court's separate Ruling and its separate Order, both on December 3, 2003.
(These orders are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Summary Judgment
Ruling.")
Since the trial court was obliged to take evidence on the remaining "claims"
that had not been dismissed, as well as Mi Vida's and Mark's claims for fees, further
evidence was adduced at trial that bore on the issue of what Nancy knew or should
have known and whether there was any merit in her claims. Paradoxically, some of
this evidence was introduced by Nancy herself. Since she sought to prove that one
more of her remaining derivative claims had merit, she further claimed that she was
thus entitled to a recoupment of some portion of her attorney fees and costs pursuant
to U.C.A. § 16-10a-740. To this end, she put on evidence of her attorney's fees and
related correspondence.
To make a long and rather dreary story short, this evidence suggests that
Nancy was advised by her own attorneys that her claims were vulnerable to a statute
of limitations defense; they also disclosed to her that she might be vulnerable to
sanctions like an assessment of attorney fees and costs.
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B. Factual History
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(h), Mark adopts Co-Appellee Mi Vida's
Factual History. Mark would further note that the Appellants' Brief continues the
same pattern found in the complaint originally filed in the Colorado Action:
Appellants seem utterly incapable of stating facts without personalizing them, forever
imputing motives and lacing the narrative with snide remarks and gratuitous insults.
Whether the purposes of these comments is to injure and annoy, or simply to
fortify Appellants' convictions with emotion where there is a dearth of facts, is hard
to say. This much, however, can be safely said: none of this is a constructive
contribution to the argument since these rhetorical techniques merely serve to
advertise and amplify the breadth of the logical gap in the argument. Using
emotively charged words in a vain effort to construct a kind of verbal bridge across
this gap does not get the job that needs doing done.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mark would have the Court take special notice of the fact that this
consolidated appeal involves two separate appeals by the Appellants.

This

procedural fact has added significance for both appeals, as explained below.
A. The First Appeal Granting Summary Judgment
The Summary Judgment Ruling, effectively dismissed the bulk of the
shareholder derivative claims, which had grounded the claims for dissolution and
receivership. This was done on the basis that the facts alleged in support of these
claims, with the singular exception of the ITEC transaction, concern matters which
5

transpired years before, so that the statute of limitations expired long before Nancy
and her son, Charles III, filed their claims with the other Dissidents.
Appellants do not here contest the applicable statute of limitations. Rather,
they make two arguments: first, they argue that there was, as of the date of the
Summary Judgment Ruling, a factual dispute concerning whether Nancy knew or
should have known about the events in question; and, second, they argue that since
"the ITEC deal underlies all of the claims for relief, and therefore because the ITEC
transaction was properly pled within the statute of limitations, none of the claims
should have been dismissed." Appellants' Brief at 19.
The first thing to notice here is that Nancy does not defend her dismissed
claims on the basis that they were meritorious if somewhat stale. Rather, the defense
is that she did not know that they lacked merit at the time she made them, which is
something rather different. The difference is crucial here, for the reason stated by Mi
Vida in its Brief: eventually, the Summary Judgment Ruling notwithstanding, these
matters were actually tried before the court below in April and May of 2003, seven
months after the Summary Judgment Ruling, because Mark and Mi Vida pressed for
the recovery of their fees and costs. Consequently, the issue of Nancy's knowledge,
or lack thereof, was actually tried on the merits, and she had every opportunity to put
on her case. In short, the issue of whether she could in fact controvert the finding
that she knew or should have known that her claims had no basis in fact was fully
resolved and moots any objection that the trial court's Summary Judgment Ruling
and subsequent certification as "final" was premature.
6

For the rest, the response to Nancy's first argument is just this: to this day,
no evidence, over and above Nancy's protest of actual ignorance of the underlying
facts, supports the allegation that she did not know the underlying truth; indeed, all of
the evidence controverts this allegation, and this evidence consists of not only hard
documentary evidence providing her with notice of the events at issue, but the fact
that much of this evidence was reviewed by two attorneys engaged by Nancy for just
this purpose.
It is hard to know what to say with regard to the second argument; it is just
absurd on its face. As explained below, the ITEC transaction, which occurred in the
late 1990s, has nothing whatsoever to do with the other alleged "defalcations," even
if the latter are viewed as meritorious, because they occurred many, many years
before.
B. The Second Appeal/Attorney Fee Assessment
The focus of the second appeal is concentrated entirely on the issue of
whether attorney fees and other costs were properly assessed against Nancy and
Charles, III. This was done on multiple bases, which will be briefly recounted here.
Once again, however, the first thing to notice is that Appellants do not defend
themselves against the assessment on the grounds that they believed then, or even
now, that their claims were meritorious. Rather, the argument is that Nancy lacked
the requisite intent, manifesting bad faith or some improper purpose, when she filed
her claims, because she did not know anything.
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The problem for Appellants is, once again, a paucity of evidence supporting
the desired inference. In fact, there is no evidence whatsoever cited from the record
itself in support of Nancy's "good faith." What is rather worse, no effort is made by
Appellants, in compliance with Rule 24(a)(9), to marshal the record evidence that
supports the trial court's challengedfindingof bad faith or improper motive.
The mootness of the first appeal is confirmed by the fact that were this Court
to grant the appeal, the remedy would be a remand wherein the trial court would be
instructed to take the evidence of the very sort it had in fact actually heard when the
remaining claims were tried over a period of six (6) days in April and May of 2003.
And it must be admitted that the evidence in favor of the trial court's findings of fact
on this score is considerable, as the following considerations suffice to show.
All of Appellants' arguments regarding the claims made below, both in Utah
and, prior to that, in Colorado, must be appraised within the larger context in which
they were originally made. The original complaint filed by Nancy and her cohorts
had, as its principal purpose, the removal of the existing management of Mi Vida and
its replacement by a receiver, to be followed by a ruinous dissolution or partition of
its assets. The remaining claims for relief, the shareholder derivative claims and the
so-called "direct" claims, merely afforded the pretext for dissolution and, in turn, the
interim appointment of a receiver. This otherwise hopeless hodgepodge of "claims"
from the Dissidents gains unitdry meaning only insofar as they afford "grounds" for
dissolution under the involuntary, judicial dissolution statute. The Dissidents simply
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had to make some such claims if they were to have any hope of wresting the control
of Mi Vida awayfromMark and the others.
In short, the best evidence of the Appellants' intent is the overall structure
their case took from the very start; this and the fact that this intent never varied
throughout and was stubbornly maintained to the very last. The principal purpose
was never to realize or "recover" the full value of their shares. On the contrary, this
very object was studiously avoided, much as a "greenmailer" avoids (above all else)
selling his shares on a market basis since this is inconsistent with his primary
objective of being bought out at a premium. What to do then? Wreak as much harm
as possible in hopes of gaining "leverage" and, thus, preferential treatment. It is an
old story, ever tiresome in the telling, and the current case is but yet another
instantiation of a familiar stratagem whereby one endeavors to get more than one's
due and, to that end, is prepared to traumatize everyone else to get it.
None of this was lost on the trial court, which shrewdly sensed at the very
outset that things were radically amiss when it was asked to review the Dissidents'
efforts to dissolve a Utah corporation in another state, even though the overwhelming
bulk of its assets were located in Utah. This decision to seek the dissolution of a
corporation in another jurisdiction was problematic enough, but (abstruse
jurisdictional scruples, however weighty, aside) more troubling was a substantive
question: why wouldn't disgruntled minority shareholders want to be bought out of
an investment in a corporation run by such (allegedly) horrid people?
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To appreciate the full force of this question, two further facts must be
appreciated. First, Utah has a procedure that faithfully replicates §1434 of the Model
Business Corporation Act ("MCBA"), which provides for the buyout of shareholders
who make a claim for dissolution. This procedure, found at U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434,
provides a mechanism, too, for the valuation of not only the stock but any other
claims a shareholder might have against a corporation, like legitimate "derivative"
claims. Thus, if it proves true that, say, some corporate officer "diverted" assets
belonging to the corporation to himself or some third party, the full value of those
assets are deemed fully recovered by the corporation, and the dissenting
shareholders' shares are enhanced in value accordingly. In this way, nothing is "lost"
in a buyout if the disgruntled shareholders had a legitimate claim; he or she is "made
whole." This is the first fact to be appreciated.
The second fact is that, Colorado, where Nancy, et al., opted to file their
case, has no such procedure! Why, then, elect to proceed in Colorado? This was the
initial question that the trial court posed to the Dissidents' counsel at a hearing held
on April 10, 2000 when it was asked by Mi Vida to enjoin the Dissidents from
seeking dissolution outside of Utah in a state that did not give corporations the right
to buyout shareholders requesting dissolution.

No answer was forthcoming.

Patiently, the court persisted and pressed again. In the end, no real answer was to be
had.
The details are recounted below.

It is fair to say, however, that this

interchange informed the entire course of the proceedings that followed. Why did the
10

dissident shareholders resist the opportunity to be made whole? What was to be
gained? Apparently, the opportunity to be made whole was not enough - more was
desired, more than what they were otherwise legally entitled to receive. It was at this
juncture that one got the not-so-subtle point that some improper purpose was afoot.
On a more substantive level, there were other aspects of the Dissidents' case
that were no less troubling. In order to support their claim for dissolution, admittedly
a drastic remedy, the dissidents asserted massive "waste" and a wide-ranging
"diversion" of corporate assets - the dramatic effect of which was heightened by
accusations of "self-dealing" by Mark and others. The description was cast in lurid,
melodramatic prose, salted with salacious soap-operatic details, and everything was
expressed in a tone of heightened urgency. While the case principally concerned
events that occurred decades before, something drastic had to be done, and be done
immediately.
The trouble was that all these accusations, so easily made, ran afoul of a few
stubborn facts. Mi Vida's assets consisted almost entirely of real estate, and vacant
land at that, with very little income. In fact, the income for the corporation was
scarcely sufficient to pay the ad valorem property taxes assessed against the land.
These facts were, and remain, undisputed.
More to the point, these plain, homely facts immediately suggest problems
for anyone contending that Mi Vida's real estate assets were "diverted" or
"misappropriated." If, as alleged, there were "diversions," then any and all such
transfers would show up in the public records by way of deed or encumbrance.
11

Again, what Mi Vida originally had in the way of real estate was evidenced by deeds
to Mi Vida. Any subsequent sale or transfer by Mi Vida out of Mi Vida could readily
be "proved up" by a review of the public records. A good start, then, in proving a
case for diversion would be to pull Mi Vida's tax records from the assessor's office
to see what parcels it still owned. Again, that's easy and would at least give you your
start. If you were also nervous about encumbrances, like mortgages and other liens, a
title company could be recruited to do the rest, again in short order. And, surely, if
you were conscientious, or just mindful ofyour Rule 11 obligations, this is how you
would proceed before filing suit and before you started making all sorts of wild
accusations.
Now there is no need to overstate matters from the other side here. A check
of the public records would only give you your start. While it takes you far, it is not
definitive because there are other ways in which "self-dealing" might manifest itself,
even with a corporation that consists almost exclusively of unimproved real estate.
Maybe there should have been transfers "in" that did not occur. It is presumably to
cover this sort of possibility that the Dissidents further alleged a claim of "taking of
corporate opportunity." But then the mere possibility of this sort of thing happening
does not suffice to support a genuine legal claim; you must be prepared to explain
why you think some such thing actually occurred.
The problem that immediately and directly confronts any such suggestion is
that before you can make it you have to allege, and be prepared to prove, two other
things: first, that there was an opportunity that somehow "belonged" to the
12

corporation, and, second, that the corporation was in a position financially to avail
itself of the opportunity thus provided. Both of these things are necessary if any
putative plaintiff is to hope to make his case alleging a taking of corporate
opportunity.
Nancy's problem here, and it is an almost insurmountable problem, is once
again those stubborn facts we just alluded to, viz., Mi Vida had next to no operating
income. How, then, could it buy still more assets? Lest it be suggested that while
this was indeed the case, Nancy, et al.9 were not in a position to know as much, there
is the added fact that she was in possession of Mi Vida's income tax returns for the
years in which these multifarious "opportunities" presented themselves. A serious
question is raised, therefore, about what she and her fellow dissidents actually
believed about Mi Vida's financial-wherewithal to realize any alleged opportunities.
Before this Court decides to indulge Nancy's suspicions, seeking some
credence in the barest possibility that they might be true, despite those plain, homely
though stubborn facts enumerated above, it will want to know whether and when she
was warned of these problems, even if they did not occur to her as, we contend, they
should have occurred to anyone making the claims she made.
Again, an answer is readily forthcoming: Nancy and her cohorts were
warned from the very outset that Mark and Mi Vida would make these very points
when they moved to dismiss the Boulder Complaint (even before filing an answer
and listing their defenses). While it is true that the Boulder Court denied this motion,
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the Dissidents were advised from the get-go that the battle was joined on this issue,
and would be fought (at least in part) on these very grounds.
More to the point, the Utah trial court raised those exact same issues in its
original Ruling enjoining the Dissidents from proceeding in Colorado, at least with
respect to Mi Vida's Utah real estate. See Steen Addendum, Exhibit A, p. 7. And yet
Nancy persisted. Given the opportunity to abjure her derivative claims when the
Colorado Action was dismissed, instead she renewed them. The Colorado claims,
with some curious exceptions, go over essentially unchanged when she re-files her
pleadings in Utah (now framed as counterclaims against Mi Vida and cross-claims
against Mark). She takes care only to make them more nebulous and indefinite,
perhaps in hopes of immunizing them from definite refutation.
Such hopes proved vain. The law on this score is plain: fee assessments and
like penalties are awarded not only when a party files pleadings that are themselves
sanctionable but also when you stubbornly persist in maintaining proceedings that
are sanctionable. Indeed, it is arguable that the latter conduct is the more egregious.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS THAT HAD EXPIRED UNDER THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
The bulk of the Dissidents' derivative case concerned the alleged "diversion"
of assets which, they claim, were owned by Mi Vida. Since none of these assets were
ever actually titled in Mi Vida's name, the argument was made that they should have

14

been titled in Mi Vida's name because it was the rightful owner. These assets can be
grouped together so that they fall into one of four categories:
(1) certain Personalty;
(2) the Cosmos Claims;
(3) the Little and Rodgers Claims; and
(4) the ITEC contract rights.
In its ruling granting summary judgment, the trial court dismissed all of Nancy's
derivative claims with respect to those assets in categories (1) through (3), on grounds
of the applicable statutes of limitation. However, it declined to dismiss any claim
pertaining to the ITEC transaction on the same basis since it was more recent. See
Exhibit 3 of Appellants' Addendum.
Appellants proceed to question in this appeal certain aspects of the Summary
Judgment Ruling, through, to be sure, only certain aspects of that ruling. It is important
to appreciate on what particular legal basis the Summary Judgment Ruling is disputed
and here appealed. Nancy does not question the trial court's citation of the proper
statute, or its calculation of the proper pertinent time period. The trial court held that
U.C.A. § 78-12-27's three year period applies, and that, given that the Dissidents'
complaint in the Colorado Action was signed on June 8, 1999, the question became one
of whether Nancy knew, or should have known with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, by June 9, 1996 that Mi Vida had no claim to the assets in question. Here the
trial court cites Stewart v. K&S Co., 591 P. 2d 433 (Utah 1997) in establishing June 9,
1996 as the "cut-off date."
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Nancy, for her part, denies having such knowledge until "sometime" after July
14, 1997. Even then, as the trial court expressly noted, Nancy omits to say precisely
when she did learn of these things. See Appellants' Addendum Exhibit 3; TCR 3052.
(This "omission," if it can be called that, undoubtedly has an explanation that
Appellants, even now, decline to give.)
Before we try to get a fix on just what Nancy knew and when she knew it, we
need to be clear on just which derivative claims she is seeking to resurrect by framing
an appeal on this issue. Obviously, Nancy is not trying to overcome the dismissal of the
ITEC claim because, while this claim, too, was eventually dismissed, it was not
dismissed by the Summary Judgment Ruling on statute of limitation grounds.
But notice further that Nancy is not looking to resurrect her claims to the
Personalty originally alleged by her to have been owned by Mi Vida. This claim has
apparently been abandoned for the purposes of this appeal, and then understandably so,
as the trial court noted:
It appears from the allegations and uncontroverted facts that each of
these claims, if legitimate, arose at or around the time of the
incorporation of Mi Vida or within a few years thereafter;
consequently, any claim thereto is barred by the statute of limitations
on the same rationale discussed above regarding mining claims.
Appellants' Addendum Exhibit 3, p. 15; TCR at 3056.
So this ground for appeal, that pertaining to the statute of limitations, concerns
only Mi Vida's alleged ownership of certain mining claims, namely, the Cosmos
Claims and the Little and Rodgers Claims, or what we have called categories (3) and (4)
above, and nothing else.

16

With that much clear, we need to focus on just why the trial court determined
that Nancy knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known about
Mi Vida's "claim" to these assets and filed before the expiration of the statute of
limitations, i.e., before June 9,1996.
Since we are dealing here exclusively with real estate, the question naturally
arises as to what the real estate records might show about these mining claims. As the
trial court noted, the Cosmos Claims were purchased before the 1987 Mi Vida
shareholders' meeting where this purchase was discussed at length. While Nancy did
not herself attend this 1987 meeting personally, she did have two attorneys (Lynn
McKeever, Esq. and Anita Mosely, Esq.) there to represent her interests. As the trial
court noted, after reviewing portions of a verbatim transcript of the meeting, "McKeever
and Mosely participated actively in the meeting." The vicious accusations against Mark
regarding the Cosmos Claims were made then by his brothers, Charles, Jr. ("Junior")
and Andrew. The trial judge concluded that "No one who attended that meeting could
have been unaware of the Gold Hill Venture Agreement, the dealings with the Frasers,
Mark's purchase of the Cosmos Claims, or Junior's belief (supported by Andrew), that
Mark was engaging in some kind of shady dealing." Id at 7; TCR 3048-3049.
In short, Nancy was put on "inquiry notice" back in 1987 (if not before) that
something might be amiss, and she should have filed any claim then, or at any rate,
within three years of the date of the 1987 shareholders' meeting.
A similar situation obtains with regard to the third category of assets alleged
to have been "secretly diverted" by Mark from Mi Vida, namely, the Little and Rodgers
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Claims. Again, the real estate records show Mi Vida never had title to these claims, but
that Mark and his brother, John, had bought these claims for themselves in 1991. Apart
from whatever constructive notice the real estate records provided to Nancy, there was
actual notice of this purchase to Nancy as well, subsequently obtained at a Mi Vida
shareholders' meeting held in 1991, as the trial court expressly noted:
By that time Mark and another son of Charlie Steen ("John") had
purchased the Little and Rodgers claims. They did not purchase
these claims with Mi Vida funds. This purchase was disclosed at the
1991 shareholders' meeting of Mi Vida.
Appellants' Addendum Exhibit 3; p. 9; TCR at 3049-3051.
Again, the pertinence of these undisputed facts was not overlooked by the trial
court, which concluded:
There is even less basis for assuming that the Little and Rodgers
Claims were purchased for Mi Vida. There is no evidence that funds
from Mi Vida purchased the Little and Rodgers Claims. No
agreement, draft or signed, grants Mi Vida even a prospective
interest in those claims. This court doubts that Nancy ever
considered the Little and Rodgers Claims part of Mi Vida, but had
she so considered them, the exercise of reasonable diligence would
have led her to inquire about their conveyance to Mi Vida. In view
of the rancor between shareholders, the expressed distrust of Mark
by Andrew and Junior, especially the December 17, 1986 letter from
Andrew to the State of Colorado, a reasonable shareholder would
have been on high alert for any evidence of shady dealing.
Id. at 13; TCR at 3054.
What do Appellants offer against this?

Not much.

There is no effort

whatsoever to argue that these facts about what Nancy actually knew are disputed, and
that the trial court got it all wrong. Nor is there any real effort to suggest that it is
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somehow unreasonable or unfair to conclude that, these facts notwithstanding, Nancy
should have known that Mi Vida had no claim to those two sets of mining claims.
Instead, we are treated to a series of red herrings that are dragged across the
trail in hopes of distracting us from the real issue of what Nancy should have known.
Again, we are told that she didn't "become aware" of these transactions until much,
much later, and we are given her personal assurance on that score. Two points here in
response. First, it is just not enough to protest that she didn't know. As the trial court
noted, simple protestations to the contrary don't suffice under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Thayne v. Saurini, 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Second, even if she could show she did
not know, this is insufficient; the issue is not merely one of whether she actually knew,
but whether she should have known, and whether, with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, she could have then come to know. Another important fact here that is not to
be overlooked is that her attorneys knew and that is quite enough: knowledge of an
agent is imputed to the principal. See Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon,
2002 UT 99 (Utah 2002).
For the rest, Nancy contents herself with a thinly-disguised exercise in burdenshifting: we are told that she had no way to check, that Mark was not giving her "critical
documents", etcetera, etcetera.
Of course, none of this is true. More importantly, there was a way to check.
Do not forget: we are dealing with real estate here, and that is very difficult thing to hide
- if only because it is not going anywhere, too far or too fast, without public notice.
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Clearly, before making false accusations Nancy had some duty to look. And yet there is
no evidence that she even tried.
In the end, the Appellants can do no better than fall back on a couple of
wrong-headed presumptions. One is that Nancy was under no obligation to check the
real estate records because she was not herself in the chain of title. But this is wrong.
Recall that Nancy's claims are derivative claims made allegedly on Mi Vida's behalf.
Clearly, then, there was an obligation imposed on her to check Mi Vida's chain of title
before asserting claims on its behalf.
Second, it is simply false that "the ITEC deal underlies all of the claims for
relief." Most of the claims concern transfers that occurred years and years before ITEC
ever same into existence. Thus, quite apart from any claims to "profits" for Mi Vida or
other contract rights as a result of the ITEC deal of the late 1990s, the Dissidents had
claimed that Mi Vida had, or should have had, title to the Cosmos Claims and the Little
and Rodgers Claims back in the 1980's and early 1990's because their ownership had
been "diverted" from Mi Vida. Consequently, it was these claims of "diversion," quite
apart from the ITEC deal, that were dismissed on a statute of limitations basis, whereas
the latter was not.
Onefinalpoint. The Dissidents appeared to have been warned about statute of
limitations problems by their initial set of attorneys, Reiman & Bayaz, P.C., since those
attorneys formally disclaimed responsibility for statute of limitations problems in their
formal fee agreement. While they were on contingency, they maintained time billing
records, which show they researched the statute of limitations problem. See Appellants'
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Trial Exhibit 418, which contains the fee agreement; see also the time entries for April
14th and 17thJust before theyfiledthe Colorado suit.
B. WHETHER THE RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION OF THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS FINAL WAS IN ERROR
Appellants next complain that they were somehow prejudiced by the trial
court's certification of the Summary Judgment Ruling as "final." However, they do
not bother to say exactly how they themselves were so prejudiced; instead they
merely contend that "the court's certification was a waste of judicial resources as the
final judgment did not dispose of any single claim or party." Appellants9 Brief at 21.
While the Appellants newly-found concern for "judicial resources" is something to
be encouraged, it is belated to say the least, having dragged the Appellees through the
district courts of two states only to have all of their claims dismissed.
The fact remains that that Appellants do not even begin to explain how they
would stand to benefit were the trial court's certification reversed by this Court. In
short, they do not explain how the trial court's error (if it is an error) constitutes
reversible error. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61. For instance, Appellants do not argue that
they are now in possession of evidence that would tell against the trial court's finding
that Nancy should have pursued (or at least checked out) her various derivative
claims that the trial court had dismissed more than two years ago. Appellants do not
argue either that their dismissed claims are meritorious on the basis of newly
discovered evidence they did not have the opportunity to present because of the
Summary Judgment Ruling.
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Instead, all we get is some hyper-technical objection that somehow the trial
court failed to spell out (in detail sufficient to please Appellants) how there was no
"factual overlap" between the dismissed and nondismissed claims. Again, exactly
how this prejudiced the Appellants is left wholly unexplained.
But it is worse than that, because it is not even true. The fact is that there are
very large differences between the claims that were dismissed and those that were
not. The clue, of course, is the very legal basis on which some, but not all, were
dismissed. Some of the claims concerned events or transactions that occurred years
and years ago, well before the causes of action, premised on those events, were filed.
In other words, time, as much as anything else, suffices to distinguish what got
dismissed from what did not. And the time gaps are huge and cannot have escaped
the notice of Nancy and her fellow Dissidents.
However, it is not just considerations of time that come into play here. As
explained at the very outset, the Dissidents' derivative claims can be sorted out in a
way that attends to the different kinds of assets involved.

We had previously

identified four classes of claims by dint of the type of assets sought to be
"recovered," and so did the trial court in its Summary Judgment Ruling.
Talk of factual overlap in this context is thus fatuous: whether Mi Vida had
an interest in, say, "the Personalty" has nothing whatsoever to so with the ITEC deal,
and no one can credibly suggest that it does. Noticeably, Appellants studiously avoid
providing us with the requisite details of "factual overlap," and we are left to
speculate wildly about what the Appellants might have had in mind.
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It is not going too far to say that the only thing that could provide a
conceivable basis for Appellants' argument is some erroneous belief that putative
dissident shareholders are free to make some catch-all, amorphous claim for the
"diversion" or "breach of fiduciary duty" which somehow covers any and all
suspicions one might have about a corporate officer. Under this construction, a
"legal claim" comes to little more than a hodge-podge of aimless misgivings and
unarticulated fears, with every petty grievance confounded by annoyance. In this
view, in the end, a "legal claim" comes to little more than name-calling, and the
entire case takes a form familiar to small claims court: "Judge, the other guy is a jerk
and I hate him. Make him pay me some money."
This is bad enough when laymen are involved; it surpasses the bounds of
tolerance when it is sponsored and ratified by professional lawyers. The Appellants,
who enjoyed three (or more) sets of lawyers, should not be indulged.
The very purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to separate the wheat
from chaff so this very thing can not be done. The very point and purpose of
summary judgment proceedings is to see that judicial resources are not wasted in the
quixotic pursuit of imagined wrongs that find no basis in law or fact. See Reagan
Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lungren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). This is what Judge
Anderson's Summary Judgment Ruling did, and he had every right to issue it. Even
now, Appellants can say nothing against it other than cavil about the trial court's
failure to be more articulate about the "lack" of "factual overlap." Clearly it was the
Appellant's business to explain why, given a "deeper" appreciation of the facts than
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that shown by the trial court, the dismissed claims could not be dismissed, what with
their being integrally intertwined with the nondismissed claims. Instead, their job
became the trial court's "job." The irony of all of this, surely, will not be lost on
anyone.
But it gets even worse than this because Appellants, who cannot be troubled
to explain the alleged "factual overlap," ignore the trial court's more detailed account
of just why it certified the summary judgment as "final." Notice that Appellants
merely append the "Order Certifying Summary Judgment as Final," that had been
drafted by Mi Vida's attorney, at Exhibit 12 of Appellants' Addendum.
Reluctant to provide their own explanations of "factual overlap" between the
dismissed and nondismissed claims, they might have at least confronted the trial
court's misgivings about any such "overlap" in its "Ruling," drafted by the court
itself and also issued on December 3, 2002. The full text is appended in Exhibit B to
the Addendum to the Brief of Appellee Mark A. Steen.
In his Ruling, the trial judge states precisely why the adjudicated claims are
not based on the same operative facts as the claims yet to be adjudicated. No one can
be surprised to leam that the trial court pointed to the fact that huge periods of time
separated the two kinds of claims. The trial judge went on to remark: "The only facts
common to both claims are the identities of the litigants and that the other members
of the limited liability company are the business entities Nancy unsuccessfully
attempted to include in Mi Vida." Steen Addendum Exhibit B, p. 2; TCR at 3272.
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This court may note, with further interest, that the trial judge makes
reference in the closing paragraph of his Ruling to the Appellants' propensity to
bolster their "claims" by citing new and additional grievances on-the-fly, so to speak.
Appellants apparently believe that once the grounds for, say, a breach of fiduciary
duty claim have been swept away, they remain free to resurrect that claim by casting
about for new additional "grounds," thus salvaging the original "claim." The trial
judge made it plain that he wasn't having it: either those "grounds" were mentioned
and were but component parts of the dismissed claims, or they were not mentioned
and constituted new claims regarding more recent events that then had to be added by
a proper amendment to the prior pleadings. In any case, a divide of many, many
years separated such new claimsfromthe very old claims that had been dismissed.
C. WHETHER THE DISSIDENTS' CLAIMS FOR DISSOLUTION AND
RECEIVERSHIP WERE BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH, AND/OR IN
VIOLATION OF RULE 11, AND/OR CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF
PROCESS
This is not a close question. The dissolution of a corporation is an extremely
drastic remedy, particularly where, as here, the Dissidents were given the opportunity
to receive the full value of their shares under the court-supervised valuation process
set forth in U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434. Had their derivative claims any merit in fact or
law, the full value of these claims would have been added to the net worth of the
corporation, so that the Dissidents would have received their pro-rated share of any
enhanced value as well.
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Recall that Mi Vida had, from the very start, indicated its willingness to buy
out the Dissidents. (In fact, Mi Vida had stated as much in its first filings in this case.
For instance, seefflf9 and 18 of the complaint and its motion for preliminary injunction
atffi[2, 20 et seq. See TCR at 4-7, 36-38, respectively.) These offers were resisted, and
to this end the Dissidents opposed the jurisdiction of the Utah district court. Utah law is
clear that had the dissolution/receivership action been filed in Grand County, Mi Vida
would be given an option to buy out the Dissidents. Significantly, this option is not
found in Colorado's variant of the Model Business Corporation Act. The evidence is
clear that the Dissidents' Colorado lawyers were acutely aware of this situation. See
Appellants' Trial Exhibit 418, which contain bills from the Appellants' first set of
attorneys, which show that they investigated the jurisdictional issue and reviewed
Utah's statutory framework for judicial dissolution. See the time entries for August 9th
and 21st of 1998 and again on April 20th of 1999. They cannot have missed the buyout
provision. A reasonable inference is that the Dissidents studiously avoided Utah
jurisdiction precisely because of this consequence. What is more, there is evidence that
Nancy herself was fully aware of all of this since she is referenced repeatedly in the
attorney bills.
First things first, however. Is the law that governs such matters clear and
unequivocal? Indeed it is. (Here we can assume, arguendo, that there was real merit
to the Dissidents' derivative claims, thus providing them with adequate legal grounds
for dissolution pursuant to U.C.A. § 16-10a-1430(2) (or C.R.S. § 7-114-301(2) if you
prefer, which is word-for-word identical).
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The fact is that Mi Vida was legally incorporated in the State of Utah in
1972, It was then, and has remained since, a Utah corporation. The law is no less
clear. Utah law - specifically U.C.A. § 16-10a-1431(l) - holds unequivocally that a
proceeding for dissolution brought by a shareholder "shall be brought in the district
court of the county in this state where the corporation's principal office, or if it has
no principal office in this state, its registered office is or was last located," where
"registered office" is defined at U.C.A. § 16- 10a-102(30) to mean an office within
the State of Utah. [Emphasis added.]
This venue provision is not unique to Utah. In fact, it embodies well
established case law and is found in the Model Business Corporation Act which has
been adopted not only in Utah but also in Colorado.
Considering the statutory framework alone, neither corporate code of either
state authorizes the dissolution, or a receivership pursuant to dissolution, of a Utah
corporation to occur in Colorado. On the contrary, Utah law clearly insists that this
be done in Utah. The matter is really one of "full faith and credit" under the federal
system designed by the U.S. Constitution. Less abstractly, this policy of deferring to
the state of incorporation on matters pertaining to dissolution (and receiverships
incidental to dissolution) is enshrined in the corporate codes of both Colorado and
Utah.
Quite apart from the statutory regimen imposed by the States of Colorado
and Utah, all of the shareholders of Mi Vida are bound by the terms of its Articles
and Bylaws. The Bylaws (and Articles) provide a corporation with its governing
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framework. As Henn's Treatise explains: "A few cases have recognized a contract
among shareholders, which might not be amenable over the objection of any
shareholder... A provision which is invalid as a bylaw might be enforced as a
contract among the shareholders who approved it." Henn, H. Law of Corporations
(West Publishing Hornbook Series, Second Edition, 1970) pp. 225-226.
In this light, it should be noticed that Mi Vida's Bylaws in pertinent part
expressly provide in the opening paragraph that:
These bylaws are based in part upon provisions of the Utah Business
Corporation Act ("the Act") and provisions of the articles of
incorporation of the corporation which are in effect when these
bylaws are adopted. To the extent that any inconsistency exists as a
result of the subsequent amendments to the Act or the Articles of
incorporation or otherwise, the provisions of the Act or the Articles
of incorporation shall prevail over these bylaws.
See Exhibit B introduced at hearing of April 10,200; TCR at 82.
Thus, the shareholders of Mi Vida, the Dissidents included, have through their
bylaws agreed to bring their claim for dissolution in Utah where the registered office is
located given U.C.A. § 16-10a-1431. This provision, therefore, had to be enforced
much as any choice of jurisdiction (or venue) provision in any contract.
It is also worth pointing out that none of the Dissidents resided in Colorado, so
that the standard venue provisions for tort actions could play no role here.
In defense of the notion that the Dissidents were free to file in Colorado,
Appellants can apparently do no better than cite some ALR Annotation and a case from
New York in an effort to suggest that if a corporation has significant "contacts" with a
state, that alone somehow negates the venue statute found at U.C.A. § 16-10a-1431(l).
28

Clearly, it does not. The cases obliquely alluded to, but not analyzed by Appellants,
actually uphold the general rule that the place to dissolve a corporation is the state of its
incorporation, and merely allow an exception in those cases where there is a "pseudoforeign" corporation, where a corporation is a Utah corporation "in name only," having
all of its assets and operations in, say, Colorado.
But Mid Vida is clearly not a pseudo-foreign corporation. Indeed, the bulk of its
assets are located in Utah, considered in terms of value. The Utah trial court found that
"more than 90% of Mi Vida's assets are in Utah." Appellee Steen's Addendum Exhibit
1, p. 5; TCR at 46. This finding was based on the court's receipt of evidence, including
deeds, tax assessors' records, and oral testimony.
Mi Vida is not without assets. It owns property in Grand
County, Utah, valued by the county assessor at $1.5 million. Mark,
who is vice president and treasurer of Mi Vida, places the value of
the Utah property at $6.4 million. Mi Vida also owns patented
mining claims in Boulder County, Colorado valued by the county
assessor at $92,000. Mark places the value of the Colorado property
at $750,000.
The Utah property generates gross rental income of $46,000
per year, from which property taxes of about $23,000 per year must
be paid. The Colorado property generates no income. Very little of
the real estate has been sold over the years, and Mi Vida has never
had significant cash assets. Proceeds of a sale in 1994 have been
deposited with the court and delinquent Utah property taxes have
been paid.
Id. at 4; TCR at 45.
In short, it is clear by any standard that there is no way that Mi Vida can be
characterized as a pseudo-foreign corporation so long as the overwhelming bulk of its
assets and income are located in Utah. Consequently, there is no reason for any court to

29

ignore the familiar statutory regimen which obliges any shareholder seeking dissolution
of a Utah corporation to file his or her complaint in compliance with U.C.A. § 16-10a1431.
Finally, there is the aimless suggestion that the claim for the receivership can be
separated, logically, from the claim for dissolution, so that the Dissidents were
somehow free to request a receiver in Colorado for, say, just the Colorado property
owned by Mi Vida. This is misleading for two reasons. First of all, the Dissidents
asked, quite expressly in the Colorado Action, for a Colorado court to appoint a receiver
under that court's jurisdiction for all of Mi Vida's property, including the bulk of its
property which is found in Utah. See TCR at 8. Secondly, their efforts to get a receiver
appointed were tied entirely to the statute for judicial dissolution. Id. If there was no
justification for dissolution, there was no justification for the appointment of a receiver.
In short, there was no reasonable basis, in law or in fact, for the Dissidents to
seek dissolution and receivership in a Colorado courtroom. That much is clear: the
Colorado filing lacked merit. So why, in spite of all this, did the Dissidents elect to sue
in Colorado? And was any improper purpose revealed in doing so?
Several reasons suggest themselves, but none more than that Utah has a
mandatory buyout provision (viz., U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434), whereas Colorado most
decidedly does not. Evidence was produced which showed that the Dissidents did not
want to be simply bought out; they wanted to be bought out at a premium. In particular,
they wanted a minority of the shareholders to be given all of the land in Utah, with
Mark, John and the others left with only the land in Colorado. See Appellee Steen's
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Addendum, Exhibit A at 4; TCR at 96. Furthermore, they wanted the whole of Mi Vida
to be liquidated so that it would cease to function altogether, and the non-dissenting
shareholders, too, would be obliged to suffer taxation on their liquidating distributions.
This maneuver was spiteful and malicious.
Mark and Mi Vida believe that the Dissidents formulated their pleadings, not
with a mind to articulating a bonafidecomplaint, but rather with a view of wreaking the
greatest possible trauma on the majority. The Dissidents' derivative claims (save for the
most recent ITEC transaction) had to be known by them to be stale, and yet they filed
them. The motive for this was they needed to find some grounds for seeking a
dissolution, and these are the very sort of grounds the statute specifies as necessary. See
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1432(2). In short, the Dissidents' pleadings were reverse-engineered:
their goal fixed, they then cast about for the requisite means.
And, of course, for awhile, it worked.

While Mark and Mi Vida moved

immediately to dismiss the Dissidents' complaint, the Boulder Court, as the trial court
noted in its initial Ruling, "declined to do so, noting it was required to accept the
pleadings at face value." Id. at 5; TCR at 46. Hence, the subsequent ensuing trauma.
And to what real purpose?
D. DID NANCY AND CHARLES, III HAVE REASONABLE CAUSE TO
ASSERT THEIR DERIVATIVE CLAIMS?
U.C.A. § 16-10a-740, authorizes a trial court to asses fees against parties if they
bring derivative claims that are "commenced or maintained: (i) without reasonable
cause, or (ii) for an improper purpose" [emphasis added].
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Apart from fussing for a few pages of their Brief about whether the standard to
be applied is one of subjective or objective intent, Appellants simply leave the matter at
that. They do not bother to argue that Nancy should not be held to answer under either
standard. There is certainly no effort to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's determination, let alone refute it with a mind to the applicable standard of
review.
Faced with an absolute dearth of argument by Appellants, counsel for Mi Vida
endeavors to "reconstruct" an argument for Appellants, by reasoning backwards to what
they would have to say if they were to have any argument at all, and then undertakes to
refute that. Pursuant to Utah R. App. 24(h), Mark adopts that reconstruction and
subsequent refutation. In addition, he would underscore the following four points.
First, the question is posed by Appellants about whether it was reasonable to
assert derivative claims against Mi Vida in Colorado, and yet there is no discussion of
why special mention is made of Colorado. The Appellees' position is just this: there
was no reasonable basis for filing these claims in any jurisdiction because they were
groundless, frivolous and vexatious, but there was even less reason to file them in
Colorado because (as explained at length elsewhere in this brief) they were conjoined
with a claims for dissolution, which meant that "the whole action," as Appellants like to
call it, triggered a buyout option in Mi Vida, which in turn triggered a stay of all other
proceedings outside of Utah, including those derivative claims filed in Colorado. You
simply must appreciate the full force and effect of U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434 or you will
understand nothing in this case.
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Second, Nancy conceded in her response to the summary judgment motion that
she did not have any evidence to support her derivative claim that Mi Vida owned the
Personalty. See TCR at 2727.
Third, the derivative claims pertaining to the Cosmos Claims and Little and
Rodgers Claims were dismissed on statute of limitations grounds since these
transactions occurred back in the 1980's and in 1991, respectively, and Nancy had
notice of this. It is simply unreasonable to persist in filing these claims when you know
they are stale, and after you have been advised by your attorneys of this fact. Certainly,
there was no question about whether Mi Vida and Mark would assert this defense.
Fourth, while the ITEC claim could not be readily dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds, that does not mean it was a reasonable claim to make. In fact,
Mark is persuaded that, with all due respect to the trial court, it was unduly generous to
the Dissidents. The trial court has assumed that the Dissidents were looking to the
ITEC deal as a way of increasing the value of their shares, by having Mi Vida's
participation added as an asset to Mi Vida's books.
Now, in a way, that is true. But that is only because the Dissidents had alleged
that Mi Vida had previously "deeded out" a portion of its properties to another entity,
and it must now "reclaim" that value and, so to speak, "add back in" those properties
stripped form Mi Vida's prior inventory.
Notice that in ^ 26 of their Utah pleadings, the Dissidents talk of property being
'transferred to Golden Tontine, L.L.C., Gold Reef Mining Company and/or Southern
Cross Prospecting Company." TCR at 10-11. Later in f 33, the Dissidents again make it
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plain that they think certain parcels of real estate, which had been owned by Mi Vida,
were then deeded over to other third parties - all, of course, to benefit Mark. TCR at 12.
But none of this is true. There are no such deeds transferring real estate out of Mi
Vida's name.
Niceties aside, the transaction with ITEC was a "grubstake deal" of a kind
familiar in mining operations wherein no underlying real estate is ever conveyed. What
needs to be "accounted for," then, is any realized profits (or losses). But this is not what
the Dissidents asked for. What they asked for was to have the underlying real property,
deeded into one or another company, deeded back to Mi Vida. Again, this claim is
entirely without any basis in law or fact, and it was unreasonable to suggest otherwise
when a simple check of the real estate records would have been made. Instead, we got
groundless accusations.
Needless to say, these accusations were never vindicated. As the trial court
ultimately found, there was no evidence that Mi Vida was either damaged by the
transaction or that it had profited thereby: "I didn't hear enough evidence to persuade
me that the ITEC claim is of any value to the corporation. The claim is dismissed." See
Appellants' Addendum, Exhibit 4, p. 14; TCR at 3702.
The trial court was again too generous: there was affirmative evidence,
uncontroverted by any other evidence, that there was no value to Mi Vida to be
accounted for. The relevant citations to the record can be found in Mi Vida's Answer
Brief at 30-31.
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E. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN APPLYING UTAH LAW RATHER
THAN COLORADO LAW?
This portion of the Appellants' Brief is arguably the most incoherent. Appellants
appear to be re-arguing the issue of whether the claim for dissolution, and the associated
claim for receivership, should have been tried in Colorado. Here Appellants appear to
indorse the sort of venue analysis given by the lower court in Boulder County, which is
basically a forum non conveniens venue test: in deciding which venue is appropriate,
one looks to the parties generally and decides which forum has the more significant
contacts. Somehow these considerations are viewed as trumping U.C.A. § 16-10a1431(l)'s specification of the proper jurisdiction for dissolving Utah corporations. In
fact, this whole approach views the dissolution claim (together with the associated
receivership claim) as but one claim among others that a shareholder might make, and
certainly no more important than any other.
But, with all due respect to the Boulder court, this is completely wrong-headed.
Dissolution is not simply one claim among others because it seeks the destruction of a
legal entity which is a statutory creation of a particular state. It is the other claims,
which function as grounds for dissolution, that are subsidiary. Somehow Appellants
have managed to get matters precisely backwards: it is because they had sought
dissolution that the entire case had to be transferred to Utah. Again, the key to grasping
this point lies in appreciating the full force and effect of § 1434. Thus, the trial court is
chastised by Appellants for naively believing that all "internal affairs" of Mi Vida had
to be tried in Utah. The suggestion is made that it would have been prudent to have all
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of the "nondissolution" claims tried first in Colorado. Only then, with that done and
done successfully, the business of actually dissolving Mi Vida could be safely left to the
Utah courts.
This suggestion makes no sense whatsoever. In fact, it is an act of desperation
born of the failure to come to terms with the overall structure of that part of the
corporate code dealing with judicial dissolutions and the express terms of the
jurisdictional provision in particular. This Court will not fail to notice that Appellants
never really confront the jurisdictional issue or explain how this business of "contacts"
trumps the plain wording of the statute.
Part of the problem, of course, is that Appellants have gone and confused venue
with subject matter jurisdiction. It is not as though Boulder is just a bad place to try
some, if not all, of these claims; it is the entirely wrong place. That is because Utah
provides that if a shareholder petitions to dissolve a Utah corporation, that triggers a
buyout right by the corporation, and if the corporation exercises that right, all related
claims by the petitioning shareholders are stayed, and these same claims are adjudicated
by the Utah court handling the dissolution. If there is any merit to these other claims,
the value of those claims is rolled back into the value of the stock, and the petitioning
shareholder is benefited on a pro rata basis. (He or she may also be compensated for
any outlay of fees and costs required to secure this added benefit for the corporation.)
Again, Mi Vida exercised its buyout rights, and § 1434 being what it is, that
meant that these could be no proceedings in Colorado or elsewhere - PERIOD. So it is
not as though we could have a case in Colorado and another is Utah. This was a legal
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impossibility, and this is why it was unreasonable for Nancy, et al.9 to proceed in
Colorado. They had no legal basis to do so, and, what is rather worse, they knew it.
It is this last point that requires emphasis: the Dissidents, none of whom resided
in Colorado, filed there rather than in Utah in order to frustrate Mi Vida's buyout rights.
Again, Colorado does not recognize such rights in a corporation, and by the Appellants'
brand of "choice of law" analysis, Mi Vida should not have been given these rights, the
Utah Corporate Code notwithstanding.
This is why the trial court found bad faith in the Dissidents' actions, and, in
particular, in their opposition to Utah's jurisdiction; it seemed they were trying to
prevent Mi Vida from exercising its buyout rights. Again, the trial judge could not
suppress the question that would occur to any reasonable person: why didn't these
disgruntled shareholders was to be bought out on a fair basis provided by § 1434? What
were they trying to accomplish? Apparently, they wanted to dissolve Mi Vida, but they
didn't want to dissolve it in Utah because Utah, unlike Colorado, allowed a less drastic
remedy by way of a buyout. This, apparently, was a result to be avoided at all costs. As
the trail judge wryly noted when first confronted with this situation:
Utah law provides that shareholders seeking involuntary
dissolution of a corporation can be bought out at a price determined
by the court. Utah law provides a relatively quick process for
determining this price. It is not clear whether the Dissident
Shareholders are willing to be bought out. Counsel for Charles,
Jr. conceded, arguendo, that dissolution can only be pursued in Utah,
and then noted that the Dissident Shareholders cannot be forced to
file such an action in Utah.
Appellee Steen 9s Addendum, Exhibit A, pp. 5-6; TCR at 96-97 [emphasis added].

37

The Appellants now resurrect this suggestion that litigation should have
proceeded in both Colorado and Utah, and that this was a reasonable position to take.
But it is not; it is a ploy, and a transparently insincere ploy that. The dissolution of
corporations is not some isolated aspect of corporate governance; on the contrary, it is
absolutely essential to the whole statutory regimen. As most clearly stated in Friedman
v. Revenue Management ofN.Y., Inc., 38 F. 3d 668 (2d. Cir. 1994), it is "difficult to
conceive of an issue more important to the state than a continuation or dissolution of a
corporation that was created and exists through the operation of its laws." A state has a
"strong interest in the creation and dissolution of its corporations and in the uniform
development and interpretation of the statutory scheme regarding its corporations." Id.
[Emphasis added.]
Again, Utah law, quite unlike Colorado law, has that special option which gives
its corporations the right to buy out disgruntled shareholders. This special provision,
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434, has a purpose. According to the Official Comment to § 14.34 of
the Model Business Corporation Act (from which Utah's buyout provision is derived),
the section was designed to prevent minority shareholder's strategic abuse of dissolution
petitions by making the petitioner's shares subject to a "call." Attempting to circumvent
the "call" by filing in another state is itself a strategic abuse of the process.
Providing for the corporate buyout "guarantees that the sale of the petitioner's
shares will be in a manner that is least disruptive to control or other arrangement
previously negotiated by the parties." See MCBA § 14.34 (1984) Official comment
(emphasis added); see generally, The Shareholder's Cause of Action, Business Lawyer;
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Vol. 48 at 719 (Feb. 1993). Mi Vida made it plain that it wished to avail itself of the
Utah buy-out provision, and Mi Vida would have been severely prejudiced if not
allowed to take advantage of this provision. Prejudiced not only because it would have
been denied its buyout rights, but because the Utah statute, in order to retain control in
the corporation, provides that the buyout election triggers a stay of all other proceedings
against the corporation. See U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434(4).
U.C.A. § 16-10a-1434(6) provides that, upon entry of the order approving a buyout, the court "shall dismiss the petition to dissolve the corporation," and the
"petitioning shareholder shall no longer have any rights or status as a shareholder of
the corporation, except the right to receive the amounts awarded to him by the court."
[Emphasis added.] Thus, every claim, whether designated as a derivative claim or as a
direct shareholder claim brought by the Dissidents in Colorado would have been stayed
upon the entry of the order of buy-out.
Thus, under Utah law, a stay of other proceedings is integral to the buyout
provisions: the value of the shares is preserved and not wasted on lengthy, costly and
potentially vexatious litigation. Indeed, in this way, Utah law, quire unlike Colorado
law, provides special protections for its corporations and the majority shareholders by
discouraging "strike suits." See MBCA § 14.34 (1984), Official Comment ("makes
strategic use of [dissolution proceedings] a high risk proposition for the petitioning
shareholder because his shares are, in effect, subject to a call....")
By filing in Colorado, the Dissidents clearly sought to deprive Mi Vida (and the
remaining shareholders as well) of these specially created rights granted by Utah
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corporate code. Mi Vida must be given its rights. See Matter of Tosca Brick Oven
Bread, Inc., 243 A.D. 2d 416,_ N.Y.S. 2d_(N.Y. App. 1997)(error for court to order
dissolution without honoring election rights); Matter of Importance, 128 A.D. 2d 707,
312 N.Y.S. 2d 904 (N.Y. App, 1987)("...before any dissolution may be accomplished the
majority shareholders must be given the opportunity to purchase the petitioner's shares
at their fair value. ")[emphasis added]; Matter of Julius M. Gerzofv. Coons, 168 A.D.
2d 619, 563 N.Y.S. 2d 458 (1990)(inproceeding where the majority shareholder elected
to buy out the plaintiff, information concerning the majority shareholder's alleged
misconduct may be considered to determine if such conduct adversely impacted on the
corporation 'sfair value.)
The fact that the Dissenting Shareholders reference the Utah dissolution statute
in their first pleadings in the Colorado Action showed their awareness and intent to
deprive Mi Vida of these rights. Initially, Mi Vida's Colorado attorneys were slow to
pick up on the motive, intent and effect, precisely because they were unaware of Utah
law; but the manner in which William Jennings, Esq., counsel for Charles, Jr., flaunted
the damage to Mi Vida ("But they don't get buyoutrights")at the April 10, 2002
hearing showed the disdain for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Utah court regarding Mi
Vida and its rights (both for a buyout and for a stay) upon the commencement of a
dissolution proceeding. U.C.A. § 16-10a-1431(l) was thus violated and violated in bad
faith and for an improper purpose.
Again, while the Dissidents original counsel in the case, Rieman & Bayaz, P.C.
worked on a contingency basis (50% of the proceeds gained), the firm maintained
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billing records which showed that they researched Utah law and the jurisdictional issues
in particular. See Appellants9 Trial Exhibit 418, passim, especially time entries for
8/19/98, 8/21/98, 2/22/98, 3/05/99 and 4/20/99. A review of those invoices further
reveals that Nancy was involved early on in these proceedings and then throughout.
She was, as the trial court observed, no passive spectator.
F. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND THAT
MARK STEEN BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO MI VIDA
AND NANCY STEEN-ADAMS
The last twelve pages of the Appellants' Brief is devoted to suggesting that quite
apart from the larger claims concerning the four types of property discussed above,
there were a host of other "claims" that the trial court dismissed improperly and these
"claims," if nothing else, bar any award of fees and costs in favor of Mark and Mi Vida.
We are then treated to a litany of trivialities that, somehow, cobbled together constitute
a "breach of fiduciary duty" by Mark, and one that, somehow, vindicates Nancy's
improperly filed claims and vexatious litigation strategy.
Since Mi Vida's Answer Brief deals with each of these issues in full, there is no
reason to repeat its refutation here. What we have here, of course, is a variant of what
in rhetoric is sometimes called "the-ten-leaky-buckets tactic."

While none of the

individual points made "hold any water" - not at least if you expect to go any distance it is hoped that, taken together, they might come to something, and that, at any rate,
beats nothing.
But they are worse than nothing, if only because they afford a real measure of the
Appellants' intent, demonstrated time and time again in this case.
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Outrageous

allegations are made. Evidence is produced to show that they are false. No genuine
concessions are forthcoming, but the Dissidents retreat and retrench.

Not long

thereafter, new accusations would be made, and these too would be rebuffed.
It is the same even now. As Mi Vida explains in its Brief, the latest "parade of
horribles" consist of previously abandoned claims (e.g., the request for an accounting), a
lapse in Mi Vida's registration (long since cured) and, finally, and best of all, "claims"
which arose after the buyout date and thus after Nancy lost her status as a shareholder
with standing to complain about such things.
To appreciate how delicious this is, you have to recall that Dissidents were never
ones to stick at standing: three of the Dissidents claimed shareholder status, though no
stock was ever issued to them (leaving their "interest" inchoate at best); and four of
them filed for bankruptcy protection without going to the bother of listing their equity
interests in Mi Vida as assets to be liquidated in payment of their creditors.
No one can pretend to be surprised that people who do such things, or closely
associate themselves with people who do such things, have not a care about what kind
of accusations they make: they want what they want and any means to that end suffices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a Brief that is already too long, there is no need for an extended conclusion.
An appeal is not a second bite at the apple, where you try to persuade another tribunal,
having failed to persuade the first. Distilled to its essence, the Appellants' Brief comes
to little more than this: what we did wasn't that bad, please find some way to reduce the
assessment of fees against us.
42

But Appellants have not given this Court a way. To this day, they do not
understand the consequences of what they did. Even now, they shrug off the fact that
they pressed for nothing less than the wholesale dissolution of Mi Vida with all of the
resultant trauma that would entail. And then they did this, knowingly, in the wrong
state in an effort to deprive Mi Vida of important rights it had as a Utah corporation.
Furthermore, in an effort to get this done, they "ginned up" a collage of claims
that they had to know would, in the end, come to nothing.

Undeterred, they

manufactured new and additional claims on-the-fly. In this appeal they are still doing
this, while studiously avoiding the real task at had, which is showing how the trial court
abused its discretion in assessing fees in (partial) compensation of what the Appellants
and their cohorts put Mark and Mi Vida through. What was arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly unfair about this? Again, Appellants never really say. For this reason, Mark
would request his fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P.33.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of November, 2004.

//Itiom^s Jyfonch, Esq.
1/ AllenlJ^rhorpe, Esq.
Attorneys for Mark A. Steen
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